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ABSTRACT
A trademark’s purpose is to help consumers identify a service or product’s source. To this end,
trademark owners may prevent others from using their marks on similar goods. But to ensure that
a few savvy businesspersons do not monopolize certain terms, the Lanham Act carves out specific
exceptions to trademark protection. Some of these exceptions include indications of geographic
origin, such as Bordeaux and Napa Valley. Wine, however, has long been identified primarily by the
geographic region in which its grapes grow. To ameliorate this fundamental divide, and to preserve
the integrity of their Geographical Indications in the eyes of consumers, wine producers may obtain
certification marks. But in wine trademark disputes, courts have inconsistently applied consumer
confusion analyses, creating an unclear “standard” that wine producers must meet in order to protect
their marks. This comment introduces and compares trademark protections under TRIPS and the
Lanham Act. In the context of wine, it explains the significance of Geographic Indications as source
indications, outlining why they are a point of contention in international trademark law. It then
goes on to explain the substantive protections that are available to a Geographic Indication under
the Lanham Act. Through an analysis of courts’ interpretations of TRIPS and the Lanham Act, this
comment concludes that courts often misidentify the consumer relevant to the analysis. Rather than
a highly sophisticated consumer, this comment proposes that the true consumer of wine is the
average consumer, with limited exceptions. This comment proposes that courts adopt an average
consumer analysis unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the consumer is
sophisticated. The comment concludes by answering possible critiques that this change would bring.
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I LIKE CABERNET AND MERLOT BUT I’M NOT DRINKING BORDEAUX:
CERTIFIED CONFUSION
ANGELA HUISINGH*
INTRODUCTION
In the early twentieth century, producers in France were mixing wine from
inferior regions into bottles labeled Bordeaux and Champagne.1 To fight such
widespread market saturation and fraud, France established in 1905 its first law
governing the appellation of wine origins.2 The law was ineffective because it loosely
combatted labeling fraud without addressing region classification disputes or quality
controls.3 Without a system in place to protect their unique terroir (the character of
the region represented in the wine), the producers of Bordeaux spearheaded an
arduous campaign for more stringent regulation, causing riotous outbursts.4 Finally,
in 1935, the imperative quality control legislation, Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée
(“AOC”), was established.5 The AOC has broad authority to restrict yields, articulate
regional borders, and ensure appropriate varietal use.6
Like the producers of Bordeaux, states with well-known domestic wine
producing regions such as California, Oregon, and Washington have made similar
attempts to regulate the quality of wine originating from them.7 The United States
wine industry took off with its victory against the French wines of Burgundy and
* © Angela Huisingh 2013. J.D. candidate, January 2015, The John Marshall Law School.
B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science, University of Tennessee, May 2008. My humblest thanks
to Master Sommelier Serafin Alvarado; my inexhaustibly enthusiastic and knowledgeable professor
of wine. Throughout the years, his passion taught me to appreciate the complexity and nuance
encompassed in every glass. And, in no small part thanks to him, I passed the first level with the
Court of Master Sommeliers. Many thanks to the RIPL board for their patience and attention to
detail.
1 TYLER COLMAN, WINE POLITICS: HOW GOVERNMENTS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, MOBSTERS, AND
CRITICS INFLUENCE THE WINE WE DRINK 18 (Univ. of Cal. Press ed., 2008).
2 Id. at 18–19.
3 Id. at 19.
4 Id. at 18 (characterizing the unrest as “the most violent peasant disorders that France had
known since the Revolution,” in which demonstrators filled town squares and “agitated winegrowers
staged a taxpayers’ strike”).
5 Id. at 22.
6 Id. Regulations that classify wine regions are concerned with the issues of controlling yield
and quality, because many producers add varietals not suited to express the region’s terroir to the
blends. JANCIS ROBINSON, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE 27 (3d ed. 2006). Bordeaux serves as
an excellent example of the complexity of the regulations as applied to terroir. See id. at 89. Within
Bordeaux there are several AOCs, generally distinguished by whether they fall on the left or right
banks of the Gironde river. Id. The significance of the distinction is far from arbitrary, as the soil
types, mostly limestone on the left bank and predominantly clay on the right bank, are best suited to
Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot respectively. Id. at 89–90. Given the soil compositions as well as
temperature, rainfall, and sunlight, the AOC Bordeaux requires Cabernet and Merlot to be the
predominant varietals, a fact which eludes most United States consumers. See id.
7 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. 845-010-0920 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE § 66.28.110(2)(a) (2013).

[13:203 2013]

I Like Cabernet And Merlot But
I'm Not Drinking Bordeaux: Certified Confusion

205

Bordeaux in the famous blind tasting of 1976.8 Though plagued by similar issues of
quality control and overproduction of bulk wine,9 the majority of litigation in the
United States has been over brand names.10 Consumers in the United States do not
learn about wine based on regions; rather, grape varietal and brand names dominate
how they come to appreciate wine.11 But the recent trend in the most-developed wine
regions in the United States indicates a growing desire among domestic wine
producers to protect their regional terroirs from fraud and misrepresentation of
origin.12
Certification marks fill the gaps of traditional trademark law by “protecting”
geographical indications (“GIs”) from becoming generic and losing protection.13
However, courts have inconsistently applied the consumer confusion analysis to both
international and domestic wine disputes over trademark infringement and false
designation of origin.14
8 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Wine-Tasting Epiphany:
An Analysis of the 1976 California vs.
France Tasting, in WINE AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM ON THINKING AND DRINKING 237, 237
(Fritz Allhoff ed., 2008). The Napa Valley, California wines—Stag’s Leap Wine Cellars in the red
category, and Château Montelena in the white—beat out world-renowned wines from Bordeaux and
Burgundy, such as Château Mouton Rothschild and Bâtard-Montrachet Ramonet-Prudhon. Id.
Bordeaux and Burgundy exemplify an ongoing debate within France over the role of terroir versus
the producer. See Matt Kramer, The Notion of Terroir, in WINE AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM ON
THINKING AND DRINKING 225, 230 (Fritz Allhoff ed., 2008). Namely, the traditional view,
exemplified by Burgundy, is that the grape is the vessel of the region, and the producer should
facilitate the direct translation of the regional qualities to the wine. Id. Bordeaux, with its many
famous Châteaux, on the other hand, highlights the producer and the region. HUGH JOHNSON &
JANCIS ROBINSON, THE WORLD ATLAS OF WINE 60, 64 (Gill Pitts et al. eds., 5th ed. 2005). Thus, the
Bordeaux label emphasizes the producer more than its Burgundy counterpart. Id. In the examples
from each region mentioned above, Bâtard-Montrachet is the vineyard in Burgundy and RamonetPrudhon is the producer, whereas Château Mouton Rothchild is the producer in Bordeaux. Id. at
60.
9 CAROL ROBERTSON, THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF WINE LAW: A CASE OF LEGAL ISSUES 131 (Am.
Bar Ass’n. ed., 2008).
10 See ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 84–85 (discussing the climate of competition among the
lower quality producers, e.g. E. & J Gallo, the largest producer of wine in the early 1990s, to
distinguish their products from each other on the basis of labeling and bottle type rather than
quality of product); Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that E. & J. Gallo did not copy any distinct quality of Kendall-Jackson’s bottle of
middle-tier wine, which had the label “Vintner’s Reserve” and a grape-leaf logo, despite E. & J.
Gallo’s use of a similar logo on its bulk wine).
11 See BRIAN K. JULYAN, SALES & SERVICE FOR THE WINE PROFESSIONAL 41, 78 (Lucy Mills ed.,
3d ed. 2008); COLMAN, supra note 1, at 28–29.
12 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. 845-010-0920 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE § 66.28.110(2)(a) (2013); Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 432–33 (Cal. 2004). The
California state regulation survived Gallo’s challenge in a battle that ended in a denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 462, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(upholding California legislation that prevents the use of the name of a recognized viticultural area
within Napa County even if it complies with the less restrictive federal regulations).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012).
14 Compare Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 870 (D. Minn. 2010)
(finding relevant the degree of care the consumer generally exercises when purchasing Champagne),
and Vigneron Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty. Ltd., No. C 06-00527 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28407, at *22–23 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2006) (finding the relevant inquiry depends on the
quality of the wine being purchased despite previous courts’ characterizations of wine consumers as
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Part I of this comment examines the current state of protection for GIs in light of
international trade agreements and domestic trademark law, with a particular view
toward the areas where consumer awareness dictates legal standards. Part II
analyzes the inconsistencies in application of the consumer confusion analysis to GIs
in wine-growing regions and highlights the inadequacies of the test as applied to
foreign and domestic disputes. It argues that domestic winemakers will require
protection beyond certification marks as wine gains popularity, but remains widely
misunderstood by consumers. Part III proposes that courts should presume that the
consumer relevant to wine-related certification mark analyses should be nondiscerning. This way, courts could afford a stronger presumption of distinctiveness to
domestic and international GIs.
I. BACKGROUND
There is a fundamental theoretical divide between the European and United
States approaches to protection for GIs.15 The European Union favors broad
substantive property rights for GIs.16 The United States, on the other hand,
emphasizes facilitation of market efficiency.17 The Lanham Act protects the integrity
of marks and GIs in the United States.18 The Act protects GIs not as traditional
trademarks, but rather, as certification marks.19 Nonetheless, U.S. courts evaluate
both types of marks with similar distinctiveness and consumer confusion analyses.20
Some federal and state regulations indicate a possible trend in the United States
toward the more substantive approach to protection for GIs that most of Europe
uses.21

impulse buyers), with E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (finding the average consumers of wine are not connoisseurs who exercise care beyond
impulse).
15 See Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1962); Harun
Kazmi, Does it Make a Difference Where That Chablis Comes From? Geographic Indications in
TRIPS and NAFTA, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 470, 472 (2001).
16 Tomer Broude, Taking Trade and Culture Seriously: Geographical Indications and Cultural
Protection in WTO Law, 9336 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 631 (2005).
17 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 783–84 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1881, 1883
(T.T.A.B. 2006).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012); Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1883.
20 Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1882–83; see also Cmty. of Roquefort, 303 F.2d at 496–97
(articulating that the Lanham Act protects GIs only if it has become a distinctive term understood
by the general public to refer to the goods the mark certifies).
21 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. 845-0100920 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.28.110(2) (a) (2013).
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A. TRIPS: The Substantive Perspective
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”)
represents an attempt to reach a compromise between the two seemingly
irreconcilable approaches to protection for GIs.22 At the heart of the clash lies a
theoretical divide between protecting the geographical origin itself, as opposed to the
producer of the goods.23 The European Union favors broader property rights for GIs
to protect the regions themselves, as well as the unique cultures they evince.24 The
United States, on the other hand, focuses primarily on prevention of consumer
confusion and facilitation of market efficiency, and affords less protection to GIs.25
Article 22 of TRIPS defines geographical indications as territories “where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable
to its geographical origin.”26 Article 22 then requires each member to provide its own
legal means to prevent infringing uses that “indicate[] or suggest[]” that the good
originated in a particular GI when in fact it did not.27
Article 23 provides additional protection for wines and spirits.28 It prohibits the
use of a false GI on a label, even if it indicates the actual place of origin.29 The
Article is an attempt to prevent terms of geographical significance from becoming
generic descriptors for a type of wine.30 It specifically addresses the risk of
“genericide” in the United States.31 For example, prior to TRIPS, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the registration of the mark CHABLIS WITH A TWIST, holding that
Chablis had become a generic descriptor for a type of wine in the United States.32 As
22 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
23 Cmty. of Roquefort, 303 F.2d at 496; see also Kazmi, supra note 15, at 472 (describing
European nations’ frustration with the United States’ failure to restrict the use of certain geographic
indications).
24 Broude, supra note 16, at 631 (discussing the importance of culture as a justification for
protection of GIs); see also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 303 (2006) (exploring the capacity of GIs to
create evocative and aesthetic value).
25 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 783–84 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Christine H. Farley, Conflicts Between U.S. Law and International Treaties Concerning
Geographical Indications, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2000) (exemplifying the U.S. approach
through a discussion of the conflict between Anheuser-Busch and a 700-year-old brewery in a region
known as Budweis in the Czech Republic over use of the term “Budweiser”).
26 TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 22(1).
27 Id. art 22(2)(a).
28 Id. art. 23.
29 Id.
30 Farley, supra note 25, at 80.
31 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); Farley, supra note 25, at 80–81. The term genericide refers to the
loss of trademark protection for marks that become generic. See Farley, supra note 25, at 80–81;
Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (2007).
32 Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vinters Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Interestingly, even if sales in the United States are substantial, courts often do not find
foreign producers have standing to challenge certification of American Viticultural Areas (AVAs) for
use on wine labels due to lack of actual harm. See, e.g., Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 20 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that the Chilean producer of
SANTA RITA wines did not have standing to bring a claim for dilution or infringement against the
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a result, the defendant and other producers were free to use the GI “Chablis” without
indicating their wine originated elsewhere.33
B. United States Trademark Law: Location Branded?
As a threshold to trademark protection under the Lanham Act, a mark must be
at least distinctive.34 A mark is distinctive when it distinguishes the source of the
product from other sources.35 There are five general categories of marks: (1) generic,
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.36 Generic terms are
indistinct and receive no protection.37 Generic terms are not protected because they
do not aid consumers in identifying the sources of the goods.38 Courts afford the
strongest protection to arbitrary or fanciful marks because they, along with
suggestive marks, are inherently distinctive.39
Descriptive marks are not inherently distinctive, but may gain protection if they
acquire a secondary meaning40 A geographical indication is a descriptive mark and
must therefore acquire a secondary meaning before it is protectable.41 A descriptive
mark obtains a secondary meaning when “in the minds of the public,” it can be used
“to identify the source of the product rather than the product” or the geographic

BATF for certifying “Santa Rita Hills” as an AVA despite a substantial U.S. market for the Chilean
wine).
33 Vinters Int’l Co., 958 F.2d at 1581.
34 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).
35 Id.
36 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the categories of distinctiveness
analysis to wine trademark disputes).
37 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, 502 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir.
2007); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (finding the term “Shredded Wheat”
to be a generic word for a pillow shaped biscuit).
38 Deborah J. Kemp & Lynn M. Forsythe, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: A Case of
California Champagne, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 257, 266 (2006). With wine, the source of the goods refers
to the producer and not the region of origin. Id.
39 Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 512.
While courts afford the strongest protection to
fanciful and arbitrary marks, the presumption of distinctiveness does not necessarily apply when
compared to non-similar products. See Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that SURVIVOR was an inherently distinctive rock band mark as compared to other rock
bands, but not when compared to SURVIVOR the television program).
40 Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 513.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); see also Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 513 (articulating that
a mark containing a GI as part of its brand name is not necessarily descriptive, particularly when
the region is not known for the product at issue); Mark A. Thurmon, Recent Developments in
Trademark Law, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 6 (2009). Professor Thurmon argues that
terms including a geographical indication still deserve a distinctiveness analysis based on the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the case. Id. He argues that the term “Utah Lighthouse,” used
for a business that promotes criticisms of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, is not
descriptive despite its use of a geographical indication. Id.; see also Utah Lighthouse Ministry v.
Found. for Apologetic Info. & Res., 527 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (10th Cir. 2008).
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origin.42 Some wine GIs, such as Champagne and Chablis, which have become
generic in the United States, belong to a statutorily created category called semigeneric marks.43 The statute provides these semi-generic marks with slightly more
protection than they would have as non-distinctive generic marks.44
An applicant may register a trademark under the Lanham Act if the mark is
distinctive and it meets the criteria laid out in § 1052.45 For example, the mark must
be non-functional, not scandalous or immoral, and not disparaging of a person, living
or deceased.46 If a mark is registered under the Act, courts presume the mark is
distinctive.47 The presumption of distinctiveness shifts the burden of proof from the
trademark-holder to the alleged infringer.48 The Act also protects unregistered
marks if a court determines they meet the Act’s registration criteria.49 The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) will not register a mark if, when
used “in connection with the goods” in question, it “is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of them.”50 To prove this, the USPTO requires that the
location of origin of the goods is material to the consumer’s decision to purchase those
goods.51
Once courts determine the mark has met the threshold Section 1052
requirements for protection, an infringement claim must establish a likelihood of
consumer confusion.52 Courts employ variations of an eight-factor test to determine

42 Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 513 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982).
43 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c)(2)(B) (2012). The statute contains a list of semi-generic designations of
wine regions in Europe such as Burgundy, Champagne, Chablis, Chianti, Madeira, and Tokay. 26
U.S.C. § 5388(c)(2)(B). Producers may not include regions designated as semi-generic on wine labels
without identifying the true region of origin. 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c)(1).
44 See Hughes, supra note 24, at 379 n.419 (comparing BATFE’s category of semi-generic marks
to a class of “highly descriptive” marks exempted from trademark protection).
45 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012); see also Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding a registered trademark creates a presumption of distinctiveness; or, if it is a
descriptive mark, that it has obtained a secondary meaning).
48 Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2007); Burke-Parsons-Bowlby
Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 594 (1989).
49 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
50 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3).
51 In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court held that the
mere existence of a goods-place association is insufficient to create an inference of deception without
a showing that the association is material to consumers. Id.
In so doing, the “material to
consumers element” was added to the Section 1052(e) “primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive” test. Id. The court heightened the standard for non-registerability of geographically
descriptive marks beyond a mere showing of the existence of a goods-place association. Id.; see also
Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vinters Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (allowing the registration of CHABLIS WITH A TWIST when the French winemaker plaintiff
was unable to show a goods-place association). But see Mary LaFrance, Innovation Palpitations:
The Confusing Status of Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 125, 142
(2004) (arguing that it is not clear that Congress intended to create the same standard for both
§ 1052(a) and § 1052(e)(3), particularly since they are separate categories).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012); Leelanau Wine Cellars, v. Black & Red, 502 F.3d 504, 515 (6th
Cir. 2007).
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whether consumers are likely to think the brands are confusingly similar.53 Many
courts apply the following factors:
(1) strength of the senior mark; (2) relatedness of the goods or services; (3)
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) the intent of
defendant in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.54
Courts do not always require consideration of all the factors in their analyses.55
Application of the consumer confusion analysis to wine depends on a number of
issues, such as the degree of care exercised by the consumer,56 and application of the
similarity of the marks prong.57 Some courts have held that the consumer relevant to
the test is the discerning wine drinker.58 Others have attempted to determine how
discerning a consumer is with respect to the particular wine.59 Still others have held
the standard is the average consumer.60
In addition, courts have held that the distinctiveness of the label design, not the
statutorily-required descriptive information, helps consumers distinguish between
the wines.61 Such a holding disfavors Old World wine-producing nations that

53 See, e.g., Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 515. The Eighth Circuit uses a six-factor test.
See, e.g., Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 864 (D. Minn. 2010).
54 See, e.g., Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, F.3d 504, 515 (6th Cir. 2007); Kellogg Co. v.
Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2000).
55 Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 515; Kellogg Co., 209 F.3d at 568.
56 Compare Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (finding the degree of care the consumer generally
exercises when purchasing Champagne is the relevant criterion), with E. & J. Gallo Winery v.
Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding the average consumers of
wine are impulse buyers).
57 See Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 516. For purposes of the similarity of the marks
prong of the consumer confusion analysis, confusion is more likely if the marks are similar and in
direct competition. Id. Thus, when marks containing the same AVA designation are in direct
competition, the analysis is reduced to a question of which mark is more senior. Id. But see
Roederer, 732 F. Supp. at 878. There, the Cava producer had been distributing its brand in the
United States longer and in higher volume than CRISTAL. Id. But because CRISTAL was more
famous, the Cava, from an entirely separate region, had to alter its labels to avoid consumer
confusion. Id.
58 Roederer, 732 F. Supp. at 844, 870, 875 (finding that the degree of care the consumer
generally exercises when purchasing Champagne is the relevant criterion). The court so found even
though Cava, Spanish sparkling wine, sold at $10 per bottle, and CRISTAL, at $200 per bottle.
59 Vigneron Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty. Ltd., No. C 06-00527 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28407, at *22 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2006) (finding the relevant inquiry depends on the quality of
the wine being purchased despite previous courts’ characterizations of wine consumers as impulse
buyers).
60 E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 465 (finding the average consumers of wine are not
connoisseurs who exercise care beyond impulse when making purchases). The average consumers
are therefore easy targets for trademark infringement. Id.
61 Nova Wines, Inc. v. Adler Fels Winery LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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typically rely on descriptive information rather than ornamental flair to distinguish
their wines from each other.62
C. Origin Certified: GI Protected?
Traditionally, the Lanham Act does not protect marks that are descriptive of a
geographical region.63 However, applicants may protect their GIs under the Act by
registering them either as collective marks, or as certification marks.64 According to
the Act, the entity that registers and regulates the mark must be separate from the
parties that will use the mark.65 Some courts presume a GI certification mark is
more distinctive than geographically descriptive marks.66 Therefore, certification
marks are a possible compromise between the substantive European perspective and
the traditional United States approach.67
Certification marks are an explicit exception from the § 1052(e) list of
unregisterable marks.68 Examples of certification marks registered in the United
States include variations of IDAHO POTATOES,69 WASHINGTON for
apples,70 DARJEELING for tea,71 ROQUEFORT for cheese,72 and COGNAC for
62 Societe Civile Des Domaines Dourthe Freres v. S.A. Consortium Vinicole De Bordeaux Et De
La Gironde, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205, 1208 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (holding that the United States consumers’
understanding of a French last name was relevant to the inquiry of consumer confusion).
63 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012).
64 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012); Bureau Nat’l Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Int’l Better Drinks
Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1883 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (holding that the geographical indication COGNAC
had obtained protected status as a certification mark).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). The Act defines certification mark as follows:

(1) used by a person other than its owner, or (2) which its owner has a bona fide
intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and files an
application to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to
certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy,
or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor
on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other
organization.
Id.

66 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1899 (T.T.A.B. 2006); see also
Peter M. Brody, Geographical Indications and Dilution: Reinterpreting “Distinctiveness” Under the
Lanham Act, 100 TRADEMARK REP. 905, 925 (2010) (discussing the possibility that certification
marks may be inherently distinctive even if they are GIs so long as the consumer can identify the GI
as the source of the product).
67 Brody, supra note 66, at 907.
68 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2012).
69 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,403,069 (filed Mar. 17, 1997) (FAMOUS IDAHO
POTATOES FAMOUS POTATOES GROWN IN IDAHO certification mark owned by Idaho Potato
Commission); U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,735,559 (filed July 21, 1991) (GROWN IN IDAHO
POTATOES certification mark owned by State of Idaho Potato Commission).
70 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,528,514 (filed Dec. 30, 1985) (WASHINGTON certification
mark owned by Washington State Apple Advertising Commission).
71 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,632,726 (filed July 1, 1998) (DARJEELING certification
mark owned by the Tea Board of India).
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brandy.73 To maintain protection as a certification mark, the registrant must be able
to maintain control over the use of that mark.74 A registrant maintains control over
the mark unless it loses its significance as an indication of regional origin for the
goods.75 As with trademarks, the Act provides for cancelation of certification marks
if the mark-holder fails to maintain such control.76 Therefore, seeking cancelation of
a certification mark is one possible avenue open to producers seeking to use GIs on
goods originating elsewhere.77
As with trademarks, the petitioner seeking the cancelation of a certification
mark has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the markholder no longer maintains control of it.78 There are two purposes for the control
requirement.79 The first purpose is to protect the value of the mark itself, including
the value of the mark as a means of identifying the source.80 The second is to protect
the public from being misled as to the origin and genuineness of the mark.81
Accordingly, a certification mark-holder can fail to exercise control in two ways.82
First, a mark-holder can lose control by either expressly or implicitly permitting a
party to use the mark without complying with the quality or origin requirements.83
Second, similarly to genericide, mark-holders lose control if the mark loses its
distinctiveness as a source identifier.84
The Act also provides for the cancelation of certification marks if they become
generic.85 Famous international examples of GIs that became generic include
Champagne, Chablis, Dijon, and Camembert.86 While no company may have an
exclusive right to use a term that has become generic in connection with certain
goods, it is possible for that same term to be descriptive or even fanciful in connection
with other products.87

72 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 571,798 (filed Feb. 13, 1952) (ROQUEFORT certification
mark owned by community of Roquefort).
73 Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875,
1883 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2012); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1886
(T.T.A.B. 2006).
75 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5); Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1887 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
76 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2012); Swiss Watch Int’l, Inc. v. Fed’n of the Swiss Watch Indus., 101
U.S.P.Q.2d 1731, 1738–39 (T.T.A.B 2012).
77 Brody, supra note 66, at 917.
78 Midwest Plastic Fabricators Inc. v. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 906 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
79 Swiss Watch Int’l, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
80 Id.
81 See Peel v. Atty. Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 102 (1990) (finding a
certification, like a trademark, is only as good as the quality it can assure consumers).
82 See Swiss Watch Int’l, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
86 See Hughes, supra note 24, at 374 (discussing GIs such as Dijon and Camembert that have
become generic in parts of Europe just as they have in the United States).
87 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
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D. United States Substantive Regulations: Barriers to Commerce or Protection for GIs?
To sell wine and spirits in commerce, each label requires a Certificate of Label
Approval (“COLA”).88 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(“BATFE”) issues a COLA for information such as geographical origin and alcohol
content.89 The BATFE may prevent a mark owner from using its mark by refusing to
issue a COLA.90 Therefore, U.S. law does, to a certain extent, substantively limit the
use of GIs as trademarks.91
The BATFE sets forth conditions governing the use of American Viticultural
Areas (“AVAs”) on wine labels.92 To establish an AVA, the BATFE evaluates a
petition from “any interested party” for evidence that the area in the petition is
locally or nationally known to refer to the region in question, that the boundaries in
the petition are accurate, and that the viticultural features described are distinct
from those of the surrounding regions.93 The BATFE therefore evaluates the
likelihood of consumer confusion prior to certifying an area as an AVA.94
A brand name of geographical significance may not be used on a label unless it
meets the requirements of that AVA.95 In order to comply with BATFE regulations, a
brand name of geographical significance must indicate the actual place of origin or
take affirmative steps to prevent consumers from confusing the brand name with the
AVA.96
If consumers can be confused despite source identifying information, then
producers must rely on other factors, such as pictures on their labels, to distinguish

27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2012).
27 U.S.C. § 205(e). The BAFTE has the authority to regulate trademarks because Sections
205(e)(1) and (2) authorize it to promulgate regulations to prevent the deception of consumers and
provide information to them about the source and quality of the wines. Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (E.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999).
90 Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 462, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). While a COLA is a
substantive regulation, it does not constitute a taking because the use of a COLA is but one right in
the bundle, and a mark owner is free to use the mark on other goods. Id.
91 See id.
92 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(e) (2012). There are 208 certified AVAs in the United States. 27 C.F.R.
§§ 9.22–9.229 (2012). An AVA may be used on a wine label as an appellation of origin only if 85% of
the grapes used in production come from the area and it is approved under section 9.3 of the same
act. 27 C.F.R. § 4.25. In stark contrast, France’s AOCs maintain rigid yield, production area,
alcohol strength and grape variety control. Robinson, supra note 6, at 26–27.
93 27 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (2012).
94 See, e.g., Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6,
16 (D.D.C. 2001) (upholding the BATFE’s conclusion that consumer confusion between AVA Santa
Rita Hills in California and SANTA RITA of Chili was sufficiently unlikely to permit certification of
Santa Rita Hills as an AVA despite SANTA RITA’s considerable sales in the United States).
95 27 C.F.R. § 4.39(i) (2012); see also Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F. Supp.
1318, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (finding the brand name Rutherford Vineyard, located in the AVA of
Napa Valley, is a brand name of geographical significance where Rutherford is a separate AVA);
Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, 502 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding certification as an
AVA is strong evidence against the determination that a mark using the AVA designation had
obtained a secondary meaning).
96 Bronco Wine Co., 997 F. Supp. at 1321.
88
89
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their wines from others in the region.97 A producer in any particular region is
therefore encouraged to build consumer recognition by adding artistic flair to the
label.98 One way courts adjust a brand’s location on the distinctiveness spectrum is
the “need test.”99 The test operates by moving the mark along the spectrum
depending upon how much consumers need the mark to identify the product.100 Old
World labels rely on GIs to denote varietal, alcohol percentage, yield and production
limits, time spent aging, and even vinification methods.101 Such information is either
descriptive or generic, and fails a distinctiveness analysis.102 Conversely, protection
for GIs encourages development of recognition through a culture of quality.103
II. ANALYSIS
Despite TRIPS protections, wine GIs are disadvantaged in the distinctiveness
and consumer confusion analyses.104 Certification marks provide a possible means of
protecting GIs.105 They are insufficient, however, because they are still subject to the
consumer confusion analysis and cannot account for inherent value.106 Moreover,
courts are inconsistent in applying the relevant consumer standard in the likelihood
of confusion test.107

97 Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 877 (D. Minn. 2010) (holding
likelihood of confusion between CRISTAL and CRISTALINO despite France and Spain being
identified as the respective locations of origin).
98 See Nova Wines, Inc. v. Adler Fels Winery LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding that consumers distinguish wines based on the distinctiveness of the labels’ artwork and
not the source-identifying information).
99 Stark v. Diageo Chateau & Estate Wines Co., No. 12-CV-4385, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157794,
at *36–37 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (explaining that a mark’s level of distinctiveness may be lower if
consumers can identify the producer as the source of the product without the mark).
100 Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cir. 1988).
101 Broude, supra note 16, at 654–55.
102 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
103 See Hughes, supra note 24, at 362–63 (discussing the gradual cultivation of AOC regulations
in Burgundy to maximize the regional expression of the Champagne grape).
104 See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.
1998) (discussing how descriptive marks fall in the middle of two extremes, generic and fanciful
marks).
105 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1883 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
106 Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1882; David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the
Faith: Trademarks, Religion and Identity, 49 IDEA 233, 238 (2009).
107 Compare Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 877 (D. Minn. 2010)
(finding the degree of care the consumer generally exercises when purchasing Champagne is the
relevant criterion), with E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding the average consumers of wine are not connoisseurs who exercise care
beyond impulse).
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A. Descriptive Words Under TRIPS: “Imported” Confusion?
The United States’ fulfillment of the TRIPS Article 23 requirement108 should
mean that the prohibition against false GIs operate irrespective of consumer
confusion.109 Instead, U.S. courts look at consumer confusion: they hold that GIs
accompanied by words such as “imported” clearly indicate to the consumer that the
product does not originate from the source depicted.110 The United States’ adherence
to Article 23 of TRIPS should also prohibit uses of false wine GIs irrespective of
additional distinguishing features such as the word “style.”111 But United States
COLA requirements permit such uses so long as the alleged infringer attempts to
dispel confusion.112 Therefore, unlike in the United States, TRIPS substantively
prohibits uses that do not confuse consumers as to the source.113
There are also disparities in the distinctiveness analysis in the United States.
With respect to the threshold distinctiveness analysis, some courts hold that if an
AVA is BATFE-certified, it is evidence of likelihood of confusion with a similar nongeographic wine mark.114 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has suggested that
the existence of an AVA is evidence that the descriptive mark does not have a
secondary meaning.115 The inconsistent protection courts afford to AVA certification
results in a disparity in the distinctiveness analysis.116
Given this disparity, even if a court finds a GI is sufficiently distinctive, some
courts hold that consumers can be confused despite descriptive information on
labels.117 Yet the District Court for the District of Columbia has held that the
language “imported by” on the back of a bottle is sufficient to dispel the possibility of
confusion in which a foreign brand is the same as an AVA.118 In so holding, the court
TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 23.
Hughes, supra note 24, at 382.
110 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18–19
(D.D.C. 2001).
111 TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 23(1); see also Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag?
The Battle Between the United States and the European Union Over the Protection of Geographical
Indications, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 120 (2001) (stating that the TRIPS Article 23 standard
is strict because it applies even if consumers will not be misled by labels containing distinguishing
features such as “style” or “imitation”).
112 Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
Furthermore, congressional attempts to fight wide spread label fraud and overproduction in the
United States have been thwarted, prompting states to enact additional protection when labels
utilize false GIs. Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 432–33 (Cal. 2004).
113 Hughes, supra note 24, at 381.
114 Callaway Vineyard & Winery v. Endsley Capital Grp., Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1919, 1923
(T.T.A.B. 2002). In Callaway, the court held that the mark COASTAL WINERY was descriptive
rather than suggestive, in part because the BATFE had not certified an AVA called “Coastal.” Id.
at 1922. Thus, consumers would not need to use their imagination to associate COASTAL WINERY
with wine produced on the coast, and no secondary meaning was present. Id. The court failed to
mention that there is an AVA called “Central Coast,” of which, only a small part is actually coastal.
27 C.F.R. § 9.75 (2012).
115 Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, 502 F.3d 504, 514–15 (6th Cir. 2007).
116 Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
117 Nova Wines, Inc. v. Adler Fels Winery LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
118 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18–19
(D.D.C. 2001).
108
109
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noted that the BATFE’s purpose in certifying an AVA is distinct from the purpose of
trademark protection.119 The court reasoned that trademarks protect the markholder, whereas GIs protect the integrity of a region.120 The court therefore held that
the Lanham Act does not extend the same type of exclusive right of use for GIs.121
But the court’s reasoning fails to account for certification marks that can protect the
integrity of a region—by prohibiting producers who fail to meet certain quality
standards from using the GIs.122
B. Certified Loss of Control?
Although certification marks can provide greater protection for GIs, the
protection is still contingent upon how consumers view the identities of the marks.123
As mentioned above, the Act provides for cancelation if registrants do not maintain
control of their marks, and consumer confusion helps measure that control.124
Therefore, the consumer’s understanding of the mark is crucial to maintaining
protection.125
Proponents of certification marks as a means to protect wine GIs assert that
they inherently protect quality.126 Proponents further argue that certification marks
119 Id. Compare id. at 22 (noting that protection for GIs serves the producer while trademark
protection primarily functions to ensure the consumer is not harmed by confusingly similar marks),
with Tunisia L. Staten, Geographical Indications Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement:
Uniformity Not Extension, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 221, 241 (2005) (arguing that the
traditional view of GIs as distinct from trademarks is outdated and fails to account for the
fundamental similarity between the underlying purpose of protecting the source, whether that
source is the product producer or the geographic place of origin).
120 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 21–22. Additionally, it is possible
that substantial regulation of the quality of GIs will lead to treatment of the regions as collectivized,
which would preempt individual corporate action in the area. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape
Comm’n, 546 F. Supp. 2d 859, 941 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Plaintiffs in Delano Farms argued that the
result of such collective treatment stifled their First Amendment rights as table grape growers who
did not meet the quality requirements. Id. at 948–49. The plaintiff’s claim to the constitutionality
of the table grape grower’s provision was denied. Id. at 950–51. Constitutional challenges to such
regulation have tapered off. See Jennifer Williams Zwagerman, Checking Out the Checkoff: An
Overview and Where We are Now that the Legal Battles Have Quieted, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 149,
172 (2009). Some proponents argue that the benefits of additional funding that result from
compliance with the regulations benefit domestic producers rather than stifle their commercial
speech. Id.
121 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 21–22.
122 See, e.g., Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1883 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
123 Simon, supra note 106, at 238.
124 See Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1883.
125 See id.
126 Staten, supra note 119, at 224; see also Rosemary J. Coombe, et al., Bearing Cultural
Distinction: Informational Capitalism and New Expectations for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 891, 899 (2007) (discussing the potential of GIs to protect quality as a means to
cultivate symbolic value for specific locales such as developing nations); Robert C. Ulin,
Globalization and Alternative Localities, 46 ANTHROPOLOGICA 153, 156–62 (2004) (arguing that new
regions can graft cultural value to their GIs in order to compete with regions such as Bordeaux that
have been privileged under the traditional system); William J. Seiter, Feature: On Your Mark:
Recent Ninth Circuit Opinions Indicate What Should and Should not be Included in a Trademark
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are efficient due to the “maintain control” requirement.127 Such marks are efficient
because they are self-policing and do not require additional government regulation.128
Proponents propose that protecting GIs beyond certification marks is inefficient
because it requires additional substantive laws and governmental agencies.129 To
them, certification marks are ideal because they allow a body to regulate quality by
giving producers permission to use the mark, without requiring that the regulating
body be a government agency.130
But proponents struggle to counter the argument that the protection of
certification marks depends on the consumer’s continued appreciation of that source
as distinctive.131 The inherent value of a GI depends entirely on the consumer’s
understanding.132 If the certification mark-holder fails to maintain exclusive control
or fails to prevent the mark from obtaining a generic meaning, then there is no
reason to protect the mark.133 Certification mark-holders can take steps to educate
the public about the inherent value of the GI.134 This statement, however, does not
take seriously the view that “cultural communities consider their cultural heritage to
have intrinsic value.”135
The inherent value of wine GIs subsists on the concept of terroir.136 Terroir is a
concept that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) has held is commonly
used among wine industry professionals, such that words pertaining to it are less
distinctive.137 Nonetheless, the nuances encompassed in the term often escape the
average, non-sophisticated wine consumer.138
While Old World wine-producing regions are the traditional advocates of terroir,
New World producers increasingly distinguish their wines in terms of the
characteristics applicable to terroir as well.139 The problem for those interested in
protecting the intrinsic value of terroir is that it requires substantive intellectual

Licensing Agreement, 25 L.A. LAW. 37, 38–39 (2003) (discussing the abandonment ramifications of
failure to include quality provisions in a licensing agreement).
127 Staten, supra note 119, at 242–43.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 242.
130 Id.
131 Comiti Interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne v. Vickers, No. DCO2011-0026, 2011 UDRP
LEXIS 1242, at *45 (WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Ctr. June 21, 2011); see also Simon, supra note
106, at 276.
132 See Coombe, et al., supra note 126, at 914–15.
133 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1886 (T.T.A.B. 2006); see also
Broude, supra note 16, at 647 (discussing the primary purpose of GIs is prevention of fraud and not
protection of any inherent values that the GI may represent due to the consumer driven focus of
intellectual property law).
134 See Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1886.
135 Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. and Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge &
Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised
Objectives and Principles, Annex, at 3, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/4 (Apr. 8, 2005).
136 Kramer, supra note 8, at 230.
137 In re Les Collines, LLC, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 249, at *19–20 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
138 Hughes, supra note 24, at 358.
139 Id. at 364.
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property laws such as TRIPS Article 23, which, as critics point out, are inefficient.140
While critics generally view this as an international issue, the substantive laws
enacted by California, Oregon, and Washington, which broaden protections for AVAs
beyond federal law, indicate a domestic trend toward expanding substantive GI
protection beyond that of certification marks.141
C. Quality? Who Cares? So Long As It’s Not Fowl
Protection of both foreign and domestic GIs as certification marks, as well as
protection from geographically misdescriptive uses, depends on the consumer’s
understanding.142 Therefore, inconsistent application of the “misrepresentation was
material to the consumer” standard is particularly troubling.143 In Vigneron
Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty. Ltd., the Northern District of California
reiterated that the consumer it considers relevant to the analysis is the ignorant
one.144 But the court noted that precedent permits a case-by-case evaluation when
the prices of wines vary.145 The court held that there was a likelihood of confusion
between THE BLACK CHOOK and BLACK CHICKEN because the back of the
defendant’s wine bottle explained that “chook” was slang for “chicken” in Australia.146
A challenge from the Chilean winery “Vina Santa Rita” further exemplifies some
of the issues with the consumer confusion analysis.147 The winemaker argued that
140 See Kal Raustiala, International Rights Approaches to Intellectual Property: Commentary:
Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1026–
27 (2007) (discussing among other issues that substantive intellectual property rules can lead to
forum shopping on an international scale, which leads to an ever-increasing number of international
treaties).
141 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. 845–010–0920 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE § 66.28.110(2) (a) (2013). Compare Jay Kiiha, Trade Protectionism of Wine Brand Names at
the Expense of American Viticultural Areas: Arbitrary Protection of “Big Liquor” at the Expense of
Small Vineyards, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 171–72 (2003) (discussing the California legislature’s
attempt to close the grandfather clause in federal COLA requirements permitting use of brand
names of viticultural significance in perpetuity so long as they gained fame prior to enactment of the
federal law), with Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT L.J. 597, 649 (2012) (arguing that even state registrations with good faith requirements
in the prior use defense serve little purpose since they are pre-empted once the business expands
into interstate commerce, even if the federal registrant is a junior user who failed to conduct an
adequate trademark search prior to registration).
142 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1899 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
143 See In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
144 Vigneron Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty Ltd., C 06-00527 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28407 at *22–23 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2006).
145 Id.
In another recent decision, the Northern District of California applied a discerning
consumer standard to a trademark dispute because the plaintiff’s wine was directed toward
consumers of Lodi Zinfandel. Round Hill Cellars v. Lolonis Winery, No. C-11-00757 JSW EDL, 2011
WL 6961333, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011).
146 Vigneron Partners, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28407, at *32. Since the court’s ruling,
Woop Woop’s “The Black Chook” trademark has been canceled. THE BLACK CHOOK, Registration
No. 2,966,473 (canceled Oct. 5, 2012).
147 See Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10
(D.D.C. 2001).
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the BATFE should not have certified the AVA “Santa Rita Hills” due to likelihood of
consumer confusion.148 In holding that both region and brand could exist without
confusion, the court relied heavily on the BATFE’s likelihood of confusion analysis.149
The court also determined that certification of “Santa Rita Hills” was consistent with
its prior AVA certifications so long as the concurrent uses were not identical to the
registrant’s proposed name.150
How parties classify their products can also affect the determination of the type
of consumer that is relevant to the analysis.151 If a party purveys a luxury wine or
famous brand, the court may entertain a sophisticated consumer standard.152
However, even when high-priced products are at issue, the possibility that the
average consumer may purchase it, on occasion, weighs in favor of applying the
average consumer standard.153 Given the overwhelming number of applications of
the average consumer standard and the weakness of descriptive marks, it is difficult
to understand why consumers will not confuse SANTA RITA with “Santa Rita Hills”
if the label says “imported.”154 Yet consumers will confuse the domestic wine,
BLACK CHICKEN, with the imported Australian wine, THE BLACK CHOOK.155
In response, proponents of this highly fact-intensive analysis can point out that
it is not a precise test and the determination depends on the totality of
circumstances.156 But while the facts will change depending on the circumstances,
the issue of how to define the relevant consumer contains questions of law that do not
vary depending upon the facts.157
One example of a clash requiring the BATFE to conduct a consumer confusion
analysis occurred when it registered an AVA as “Diamond Mountain District”
because the brand name DIAMOND MOUNTAIN was already in use.158 Similarly,
because of the brand name SPRING MOUNTAIN, the AVA was registered as “Spring
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12–13.
150 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
151 Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga S.A., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 243, at *7–10 (T.T.A.B. 2005)
(entertaining the notion that there could be a sophisticated consumer standard but for the fact that
both parties classified their goods simply as wine). The TTAB in Miguel Torres held that confusion
was not likely between TORRES and MUGGA TORRE, two wines from Spain (both are from the
region of Rioja, though the court did not mention this fact), despite similar trade channels and a
non-discerning consumer. Id. at *27–29.
152 Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 877 (D. Minn. 2010).
153 Id.; see also Stark v. Diageo Chateau & Estate Wines Co., No. 12-CV-4385 YGR, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 157794, at *54 n.16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (holding that evidence of two classes of
consumers was not relevant to the discussion of likelihood of confusion despite the substantial
difference in price between the two wines).
154 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12–13
(D.D.C. 2001).
155 Vigneron Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty Ltd, No. C 06-00527 JF, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28407, at *26, 33–34 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2006).
156 Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
157 David S. Welkowitz, Who Should Decide? Judges and Juries in Trademark Dilution Actions,
63 MERCER L. REV. 429, 471–72 (2012) (discussing the need for a legal determination of how to
define a famous mark for consistent application of trademark principles to the facts irrespective of
whether a jury or a judge acts as the finder of fact).
158 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 23; see also 27 C.F.R. § 9.166 (2012)
(asserting “Diamond Mountain District” is a registered AVA in Napa County).
148
149
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Mountain District” despite evidence that the area was locally and famously known as
“Spring Mountain.”159 The foregoing examples indicate that courts are aware that
labels with regional distinctions will reduce the likelihood of consumer confusion.160
Yet, some courts continue to find confusion despite distinguishing information such
as the word “imported.”161
One possible reason for courts’ willingness to find consumer confusion despite
regional distinguishing factors is the second label explanation.162 Roederer, the
producer of CRISTAL, began manufacturing a cheaper sparkling wine in Anderson
Valley, California in 1981.163 Because Roederer produces this more affordable
sparkling wine in another region, the court entertained the notion that consumers
would think CRISTALINO (an $8 Spanish sparkling wine) was CRISTAL’s sparkling
wine from Spain.164
Another possible explanation is that the consumers relevant in determining
whether a mark is famous are the consumers throughout the United States and not
just the consumers in the niche market.165 Nonetheless, without more clearly defined
principles to guide the application of the consumer confusion standard, both domestic
and foreign producers seeking to protect the integrity of their GIs face considerable
uphill battles.
III. PROPOSAL
To accommodate concerns of foreign and domestic wine producers that the
integrity of their region depends upon the whims of consumers, courts should apply a
uniform presumption that the wine consumer is non-discerning to wine-related

159 Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 23. The AVA is now called “Spring
Mountain District.” 27 C.F.R. § 9.143 (2012).
160 See Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 871, 877–78 (D. Minn. 2010).
161 27 C.F.R. § 4.35(b) (2012) (requiring all imported wines to include the information that they
are imported); Vigneron Partners, LLC v. Woop Woop Wines Pty Ltd, No. C 06-00527 JF, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28407 at *33–34 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2006); see also Nova Wines, Inc. v. Adler Fels
Winery LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that consumers distinguish
wines based on the distinctiveness of the labels’ artwork and not the source-identifying information).
162 See Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 862, 871 (evaluating evidence that consumers frequently
thought CRISTALINO was the second wine or cheaper version of CRISTAL in light of wine makers’
trends toward making more affordable wines from different GIs under the same brand name
available in commerce).
163 See id. at 844.
164 Id. at 862.
165 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). Compare Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car,
Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Enterprise need only show that its mark was
famous within the car renting market), with Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 879 (stating that a mark
that is only famous in a “niche” market is insufficient to qualify as a famous mark for purposes of
proving trademark dilution), and Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame
in Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 89, 99–100 (2011) (highlighting the distinction between the
older enterprise standard of the consumer relevant to defining a famous mark and the new approach
since the modification to the statute in 2006).
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Although this proposal may provide some additional
certification marks.166
protection for GIs, critics will point out that it is insufficient in light of recent TTAB
and WTO decisions.167 Critics at the other end of the spectrum will argue that such
an expansion of trademark protection, although small, is a substantive extension of
the already overbroad Lanham Act.168
A. The Relevant Consumer is Non-Discerning
The courts should implement a uniform non-discerning consumer standard to
certification marks relating to wine. This will accommodate the trend among the
major domestic wine-producing regions towards increasing protection for their AVAs
and the additional protections for wines in TRIPS.169 As the prevalence of “second
wines” increases, the distinction between the wine producer and the GI will continue
to blur for the average consumer.170 Thus, there should be a presumption that the
average wine consumer is non-discerning, and the presumption should be rebuttable
by a preponderance of the evidence.171 The presumption would allow courts to
recognize the complexities involved in distinguishing the source of the goods from the
GI—it recognizes that the average wine consumer does not consider them.172
Furthermore, the non-discerning consumer presumption avoids issues that might
result from substantive IP laws, such as further extension of TRIPS.173
If courts adhere to this standard more vigilantly, then they would not have to
require consumers to understand the complexities behind the issuance of a
certification mark before making the determination that it is distinctive.174 As a
166 See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Cantine Rallo, S.P.A., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1093 (E.D. Cal.
2005) (The court declined to apply a discerning-consumer standard because the defendant failed to
provide evidence in support of its contention.).
167 ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 158.
168 Katja Weckström, The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big Business: Comparing Approaches to the
Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark Protection, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 696
(2007).
169 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. 845-010-0920 (2011); WASH. REV.
CODE § 66.28.110(2)(a) (2013); TRIPS, supra note 22, at art. 23.
170 Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 871 (D. Minn. 2010). The Internet
will continue to reduce the significance of the vendors’ locations, resulting in an increasing need for
uniform standards for GIs. Molly Torsen, Apples and Oranges (and Wine): Why the International
Conversation Regarding Geographic Indications is at a Standstill, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 31, 55 (2005). The notion that the national origin of the producer indicates the source of the
grapes is further blurred by the common practice of sourcing grapes from one country and selling
them in another. See Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 149, 151 (3d Cir.
1984) (discussing the possibility of consumers’ inability to identify the source of the goods and the
likelihood of consumer confusion when an American company sold bulk Spanish sparkling wine in
the United States).
171 See E. & J. Gallo Winery, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. The evidentiary standard applied to
cancelation of trademarks is a preponderance of the evidence. Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v.
Underwriters Labs. Inc., 906 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
172 Thurmon, supra note 41, at 20.
173 Id. at 21.
174 Compare Brody, supra note 66, at 921–22 (discussing the application of the distinctiveness
analysis to GIs as requiring that the relevant public be able to identify the GI as the source), with
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result, courts could weigh the strength of the certification mark against traditional
trademarks without treating them as less distinctive.175 Certification marks may
obtain common law protection as distinctive if the non-discerning consumer can
recognize the mark as a signifier of regional authenticity.176 Therefore, the
presumption of a lower degree of consumer care would also protect non-registered
marks from being disadvantaged in the distinctiveness analysis as geographically
descriptive marks.177
B. Likely Criticisms from Proponents of the EU View
The proponents of intellectual property rights for GIs will find this solution
inadequate because the integrity of the region still depends on the whims of
consumers.178 They will point to decisions such as Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de
Champagne v. Jehonadav, in which the TTAB declined to recognize CHAMPAGNE
as a common law certification mark, as evidence that such protection is purely formal
because it lacks enforcement.179 The TTAB was able to avoid holding that
CHAMPAGNE is a valid certification mark despite finding that the relevant
consumer was non-discerning.180
The TTAB was able to reach alternate conclusions in Jehonadav and Tea Board
of India despite using the same standard for consumer care.181 In Tea Board of
India, the TTAB left the door open for GIs to acquire inherent distinctiveness as
certification marks as long as they were not generic.182 However, in Jehonadav, the
Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne v. Jehonadav, No. 91195709, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 80,
at *7–8 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (holding that the exclusive control required for a valid certification mark
may be hindered by the presence of multiple famous marks in the GI if they contribute to the
consumer’s perception of the quality of the product from the region).
175 See Jehonadav, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 80, at *9–10 (proceeding with the likelihood of confusion
analysis between CHAMPAGNE and CHAMPPARTY as though the complainant held a valid
certification mark in CHAMPAGNE). In Jehonadav, the court declined to hold that the plaintiffs
held a valid certification mark in CHAMPAGNE, but nonetheless dismissed their complaint on the
merits of the infringement claim due to lack of consumer confusion between the two marks. Id. at
*9, *14–18.
176 Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1899 (T.T.A.B. 2006); Brody,
supra note 66, at 921.
177 Tea Bd. of India, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1899.
178 Torsen, supra note 171, at 61.
179 Jehonadav, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 80, at *8. The court questioned whether exclusive control
was possible when the individual brands in CHAMPAGNE expend substantial resources promoting
their individual quality. Id. at *6–7. The fact that the famous producers of CHAMPAGNE expend
these resources could, according to the TTAB, indicate they are responsible for the integrity of the
region in the eyes of the public. Id. at *15–16.
180 Id. at *9–10, 15.
181 Compare id. at *8 (assuming for the sake of argument that the applicant did have the
requisite control over the CHAMPAGNE mark but still holding that CHAMPARTY could exist
concomitantly without confusing even the casual drinker of sparkling wine), with Tea Bd. of India,
80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1886, 1901 (finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the GI
DARJEELING and the brand DARJEELING NOUVEAU despite multiple instances of failure to
control non-certified uses).
182 Brody, supra note 66, at 924.
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TTAB required more than an awareness of CHAMPAGNE as a region and actually
counted the fame of the region’s brands against the plaintiff’s attempt to gain
protection for CHAMPAGNE as a certification mark.183 Therefore, such a small
change in the approach to the consumer confusion analysis will be insufficient for
advocates of intellectual property rights for GIs.184 GIs face an increased threat of
genericide due to the temptation to use them as descriptors.185 In order to combat
the increased threat, courts need to reduce their emphasis on the consumer’s
awareness rather than merely alter the consumer they focus on.186
Because the EU’s position insists on the primacy of GIs over possible preexisting brands, merely adjusting consumer confusion standards will not be
sufficient.187 As a result, the EU will likely continue to advocate taking back the GIs
such as CHAMPAGNE from producers such as KORBEL CALIFORNIA
CHAMPAGNE.188 Therefore, the TTAB’s continued refusal to rule on whether
CHAMPAGNE is protectable as a certification mark represents a cork in the ongoing
debate as to whether certification marks and current consumer confusion standards
will prove sufficient to protect the interests of EU winemakers.189
C. Likely Criticisms from Opponents Who Argue The Lanham Act Is Too Substantive
As It Is
Critics of substantive protection for GIs can point out that emigrants to the
United States and Australia, among others, have been using generic or semi-generic
GIs for generations.190 These emigrants wish to continue using the marks, and
preventing them from doing so arbitrarily favors place of origin over cultivated
brands.191 Therefore, standardizing the consumer does not fix the fundamental flaw
that protection for GIs creates a substantive right to exclude these producers from
using the GI on their label.192
The right to exclude is itself a substantive limit on free trade because a
trademark is not a public good.193 Therefore, the trend toward expansion of
Jehonadav, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 80, at *15.
Torsen, supra note 171, at 52.
185 Latha R. Nair, Swiss Watch International, Inc. v. Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry:
The TTAB’s Unwitting Message for Geographical Indications?, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 944, 954
(2012).
186 Id.
187 ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 158. The author analyzed the EU’s position against the use of
CHAMPAGNE, “Burgundy” and “Chablis” on wine not originating from the region. Id. She
considered the EU’s position in light of the WTO’s ruling that the appellation of origin “Budweiser
Bürgerbrau” for beer can coexist with BUDWEISER beer despite potential consumer confusion. Id.
188 ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 163.
189 Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne v. Jehonadav, No. 91195709, 2013 TTAB
LEXIS 80, at *7 (T.T.A.B. 2013).
190 Malobika Banerji, Geographical Indications:
Which Way Should Asean Go?, 2012 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 8 (2012).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 3.
193 Compare Weckström, supra note 168, at 696 (distinguishing patent and copyright regulation
from trademark law because the former are primarily public goods but the latter is not), with David
183
184
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protection for trademarks beyond current consumer confusion standards creates dead
weight in the form of market inefficiency.194 As a result, before substantively
expanding the Act, Congress should balance the benefits of an expansion of
trademark law against the harms of limiting public access and creating market
inefficiency.195
The right to exclude produces harm by creating a potential monopoly.196 It could
also harm the wine maker who wishes to go beyond the minimum AVA quality
requirements.197 The producer seeking to create a higher quality wine would be
targeting his or her wine at a more discerning consumer.198 The presumption would
hinder winemakers by requiring them to cater to a less discerning consumer to avoid
confusion.199 It would also burden winemakers by requiring them to choose between
not associating with the integrity of the region, or producing substantial evidence
that their target consumer will be more discerning.200
CONCLUSION
Navigating around clashes between traditional trademark law, certification
marks, and GIs will be difficult in light of contrasting views on fundamental policies.
Certification marks represent the possibility of a compromise that is consistent with
TRIPS. However, inconsistent application of consumer confusion standards and
recent TTAB decisions indicate a reluctance on the part of U.S. courts to adapt to
global trends. A non-discerning consumer standard for wine-related certification
W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22, 35 (2006) (arguing
that trademarks are in part a form of public good and that the market failures created by regulating
access to them is similar to that created by patent and copyright regulations).
194 Weckström, supra note 168, at 695–96.
195 Id.
196 Compare State of Idaho Potato Comm’n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708,
715 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that trademarks create monopolies where certification marks do not,
because certification marks are licensed by someone other than the owner), with Edmund W. Kitch,
Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1727, 1736 (2000) (arguing that calling trademark rights monopolies is an oversimplification of
the word and that they might simply be property rights).
197 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 4.26(a) (2012) (A wine producer may choose to label their wine as
“estate bottled” to signify additional requirements such as 100% of the grapes rather than 85% come
from a designated area.), and ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 139 (“Estate bottled” wine is considered
to be higher quality for many reasons—the grapes are vinified in the same place as they are grown
and as such, are not harmed in transportation, and they may also express the terroir of that
location), with Ian Ayres & Jennifer G. Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing Enda
with A Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1662 (2006) (discussing the repercussions on the
integrity of a certification mark in the eyes of consumers when licensees create their own identity
independently of the mark in the employment context).
198 See Round Hill Cellars v. Lolonis Winery, No. C-11-00757 JSW EDL, 2011 WL 6961333, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (noting that consumers of Lodi Zinfandel may be more discerning than
average wine impulse buyers).
199 See ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 143.
200 Id. at 142 (discussing the consequences of strongly delineated AVAs on trademark law such
as increased consumer confusion and concerns that new producers may be unwelcome in the eyes of
established brands from the same region).
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marks could raise protection for wine GIs. However, it remains to be seen whether
such reform is sufficient to genuinely protect producers who depend on the integrity
of the region, rather than flair on their label, to instill a sense of quality.

